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Abstract
Using a simple game-theoretical model, this paper provides a new explanation for why large
rms in developing economies may willingly pay higher wages than the market wage rate. We
show that large rms can strategically create entry barriers to the modern sector by setting high
wage standards. They may do so to reduce competition, or to distort the benevolent government's
resource allocation to their benets. Focusing on the latter case, we also show that the size of the
primitive sector will be larger than the ecient level, and public resource allocation will be biased
in favor of incumbent large businesses despite the benevolent nature of the government.Using a
comprehensive survey of Chinese industrial rms, we nd that industrial concentration is posi-
tively correlated with the size-wage eect, and such eect is signicantly stronger in less developed
provinces. These ndings are consistent with our theoretical prediction.
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1 Introduction
There is much evidence of the employer size wage eect in that large rms pay higher wages than
small rms after controlling for worker characteristics, which cannot be accounted for by conven-
tional explanations such as eciency wage, monitoring technology, unionization, and compensating
wage dierentials (e.g., Brown and Medo, 1989; Schmidt and Zimmermann, 1991; Schaner, 1998;
Troske, 1999). Moreover, the wage premium of large rms is larger in developing countries than in
developed countries (e.g., Little, Mazumdar and Page, 1987, Velenchik, 1997, Schaner 1998, Strobl
and Thornton, 2002). This latter nding is particularly puzzling, given that in many developing
countries there are abundant workers seeking job opportunities. One would expect that abundant
labor supply would put pressure on wage premium of large rms.
Why do large rms pay high wages in developing countries with abundant labor supply? In this
paper, we present a simple model in which large rms willingly pay higher wages than the market
wage. In the model, there are two sectors, modern and primitive, dened by dierent technologies
used in these sectors. There are a small number of large rms that are the incumbents in the
modern sector, and a large number of small entrepreneurs who can enter either sector. However,
a small entrepreneur incurs some entrance cost to enter the modern sector, and the entrance cost
diers among small entrepreneurs. The sequence of move in the model is as follows. At date one,
the incumbent rms set a wage standard in the modern sector. At date two, small entrepreneurs
choose which sector to enter and a benevolent government decides on resource allocation between
the modern and primitive sectors. Government resources in a sector are critical inputs for rms in
the sector. In this setting, we show that under some conditions the equilibrium outcome of the game
has the following properties: (i) the incumbent rms in the modern sector set a wage standard which
is higher than the market wage rate; (ii) some small entrepreneurs will not enter the modern sector
although they should do so in the rst-best solution; and (iii) the benevolent government's policy is
biased in favor of incumbent big businesses.
The basic idea of our model is very simple. Even though paying higher wages to workers directly
reduce prot, doing so allows the incumbent rms in the modern sector to limit entrance to the
modern sector by small entrepreneurs with relatively high entrance costs. Reducing the size of the
modern sector can be benecial to the incumbents because the relative sizes of the two sectors aect
how the benevolent government allocates resources. Even though the government will allocate less
total resources to a smaller modern sector, the average resources per rm can be higher in the modern
sector under reasonable conditions. As long as government resources exhibit sucient exclusivity,
the incumbent rms in the modern sector will have strong incentives to raise wage rates to induce
the benevolent government to bias its resource allocation in favor of incumbent large businesses.
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An important assumption of our model is that large incumbent rms in the modern sector can
raise the labor costs of entrant rms in the modern sector by paying high wages, thus forcing entrant
rms to pay high wages as well. Let us call this the \wage equalization eect." In fact, the main
results of our paper still hold even if we relax this assumption. As long as high wage rates of the
incumbent rms put enough pressure on other rms to raise their wage rates or cause signicant
increases in the eective labor costs of other rms, we still have signicant size wage eect in our
setting. This is a quite common phenomenon in many countries, particularly developing countries.
For example, Magruder (2012) points out that, in South Africa, as well as in West Europe, Argentina
and Brazil, large rms adopt high labor standards and make them to all workers in an industry with
the goal of reducing competition from small rms.
The \wage equalization eect" is justied by two famous theories. First, there is a class of
eciency wage theories in the literature that have the feature of inter-rm relative wage equalization.
For example, Summers (1988) argues that \increasing relative wage raises productivity" because, for
one reason, paying wage rates higher than workers' outside opportunities reduces turnovers and thus
saves on monitoring, recruiting and training costs.1 Another justication for the wage equalization
eect is provided by a large number of fair wage theories. As an early well-known example, Akerlof
and Yellen (1988, 1990) propose \the fair wage/eort hypothesis" which argues that the perception
of fairness by workers aected their eort.2 When workers compare wages in dierent rms to
determine what is the fair wage rate, high wage rates oered by some rms will raise other rms'
labor costs and force them to increase their wages as well. Recently a large body of literature on
behavior economics emphasizes the importance of fairness and other psycological factors in wage-
setting and other organizational designing situations (see for example, Fehr, Kirchsteiger, and Riedl,
1993, and Rabin, 1998 for a survey). All these fairness considerations will tend to equalize wages
across similar rms.
The wage equalization eect makes it possible that rms in the modern sector raise their own
wage rates in order to raise the labor costs of potential entrants.3 But is there any evidence that
wage rates are used to limit entrance? In fact, in the analysis of the Pennington case which centered
exactly on this issue, Williamson (1968) argued that this was not merely a theoretical possibility but
1Specically, Summers postulates the following equation: e = (w x)a, where e is eort, w is wage, x is the outside
opportunities of workers, and a 2 [0; 1] measures the importance of relative wage comparison. Clearly, if some rms
increase wage rates, the outside opportunities of workers in other rms increase and thus the labor costs of those rms
increase.
2Specically, Akerlof and Yellen postulated the following equation: e = min(w=w; 1), where normal eort is 1 and
w is the fair wage perceived by workers.
3Chu and Masson (1990) show that incumbent rms may use high wage rates to signal their strength to potential
entrants in order to deter entrance.
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a real threat to fair competition. In this legal case, Pennington, as one owner of a relatively small
coal company, alleged that large coal companies imposed uniformly high wage rates (with the help of
the United Mine Workers) in order to drive small coal producers out of business. Williamson showed
that with the help of unions to coordinate high wage standards, indeed large businesses could limit
entrance of small entrepreneurs. If this can happen in the United States, it can certainly take place
in developing economies where the conditions are much more suitable for such predatory behavior.
It is easy to see that, with the ability to \raising rivals' costs" (Salop and Scheman, 1983)
through setting high wages, the incumbent large rms may use this strategic tool to limit market
competition if potential entrants produce competing products.4 We do not focus on this motive,
as it is self-evident.5 Rather, we focus on a more subtle motive that is perhaps more relevant in
developing countries. When studying wage dierentials across sectors, one question naturally arises:
why do the incumbent rms want to limit entrance to the broadly dened modern sector where many
potential entrants do not compete directly with them? In this paper, we identify another motive for
predation by the incumbent large rms in the modern sector even when potential entrants are not
in their industries. The motive is to distort the government's resource allocation decisions.
Governments in developing countries often have quite limited resources, but face tremendous tasks
to improve physical, social and economic infrastructures. Thus, government policies of allocating
scarce resources have large impacts on the eciency of rms in dierent sectors. For example, for
a xed amount of total education expenditure, more expenditure on higher education is likely to
benet modern rms more, while more spending on elementary education benets traditional rms
more. As another example, given a xed budget to spend on improving the transportation system of
the country, building an air transportation system that connects large cities benets large rms more,
while improving local transportation infrastructure of many medium- or small-sized cities benets
small rms more. Because such government resources are quite limited in developing countries, they
are likely to have a strong degree of exclusivity in that more users will reduce the marginal product
of these resources to all users. Therefore, the incumbent rms in the modern sector will feel the
pressure of potential entrants to the modern sector competing with them for the use of the scarce
4Compared with prices or quantities, wage rates as an instrument to deter entrance have certain advantages.
First, prices, quantities and other similar predatory instruments can be detected relatively easily, which may result in
resentment or even legal actions by the government. In contrast, a high wage standard is more likely to be welcomed
by the government since it increases income of workers in the modern sector. Secondly, potential entrants may not
enter the same industries the incumbent rms are in, so prices and quantities cannot prevent entrance. In addition, if
rms can export to the world market, prices and quantities will not be eective in deterring entrance either.
5One possible implication of this direct anti-competitive motive may be the high wage levels in the nancial sector,
especially among large investment banks. High wage standards may make entrance quite costly, thus rearming the
concentrated industry structure of the sector.
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government resources. This can motivate the large incumbent rms in the modern sector to limit
entrance by setting high wage standards.
Governments in developing countries are often said to be captured or corrupted by large rms
so their policies are often biased in favor of incumbent big businesses. Instead of direct capturing
through lobbying and bribery, our analysis shows that large businesses can indirectly capture the
government through distortional market behavior. For example, it has been an often heard criticism
that developing countries tend to overemphasize higher education.6 In this case, it is not clear how
direct capturing by large businesses causes such a common bias. By our analysis, this overspending
on higher education can be a result of a purely benevolent government induced by large businesses
to favor their sector. Note that in real life large businesses may not act purposefully to inuence the
government through setting high wages, but this does not negate the eect identied in the model.
Moreover, the wage equalization eect is self-enforcing in the sense that as long as some incumbent
large rms set high wages, other incumbents will see their eective labor costs rise and will follow
suit. Thus, no explicit coordination among large incumber rms is needed.
Our model predicts that the size-wage eect, the relative size of the primitive sector, and the
degree of bias on government spending (which can be proxied by, for example, the ratio of higher
versus elementary education expenditures), are positively correlated. If we consider large incumbent
rms' direct competition motive to limit entrance to their own industries, then we expect the size-
wage eect is positively correlated with industrial concentration. Furthermore, such size-wage eect
is usually more signicant in developing regions, because the competitions between modern and
primitive sectors are more frequent, and the governments in developing countries are usually more
likely to be captured by large rms in modern sectors. We conduct an empirical analysis based on a
comprehensive survey of Chinese industrial rms to test these implications. Our empirical ndings
indicate that the size-wage eect is indeed positively correlated with industrial concentration, and it
is indeed more signicant in low-income Chinese provinces.
Our paper contributes to the literature that tries to explain the size-wage eect that cannot be
counted for by the conventional explanations. One approach argues that unobservable productivity
dierences of workers in large and small rms, in particular, as a result of dierences in general
and specic human capital investments, are the main reason behind the size-wage premium (see, for
example, Oi and Idson, 1999, Zabojnik and Bernhardt 2001, and Feng and Zheng 2010). Another
kind of explanation is based on labor market frictions such as on-the-job searching (Burdett and
Mortensen, 1998) and private information (Feng and Zheng, 2009). Our paper diers from these
6A classical textbook of development economics says \LDC governments have unwisely invested too much in higher
education." (Todaro, 1994, p.370)
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approaches in that large incumbent rms use high wage rates as an instrument to limit entrance to
the modern sector. Our explanation is more relevant to developing countries, and thus is more of
an explanation of why the wage premium of large rms is greater in developing countries than in
developed countries than of an explanation of the general size-wage eect.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The next section sets up the model, and Section 3
presents the equilibrium analysis of the model. Section 4 contains extensions and discussions of the
basic model. Section 5 provides an empirical analysis that corroborates our theory, followed by the
concluding remarks in Section 6.
2 Model
2.1 Model Setup
We consider a developing economy with one nal consumption good that serves as the numeraire.
Labor is abundant, so labor supply is inelastic. Workers are identical. These conditions imply that
the market wage rate, denoted by w0, is set at the subsistence level. The economy has two sectors,
each consisting of rms using one of the two technologies available to produce the consumption good.
Each technology is represented by a Cobb-Douglas production function: for technology i = 1; 2:
Fi = Ail

i g

i :
where Fi is the output of a representative rm using the technology i, Ai > 0 is a productivity
parameter, li is the number of workers, and gi is the amount of government resources that are
available to each rm using technology i. We suppose A1 > A2, so technology 1 is more ecient
than technology 2. We refer to technology 1 as \modern technology" and rms using technology 1
as \in the modern sector". Technology 2 is called \primitive technology" and rms using technology
2 are called \in the primitive sector." Note that for simplicity, capital is not explicitly shown in the
production functions, but is implicitly included in Ai. Thus, we should have +  < 1.
At a wage rate w, a prot-maximizing rm in sector i will have the following optimal employment
level (li) and the corresponding revenue (Ri) and prot (i):
li = (
Ai
w
)
1
1  (gi)

1  ; Ri = A
1
1 
i (

w
)

1  (gi)

1  ; i = (1  )A
1
1 
i (

w
)

1  (gi)

1  : (1)
When g1 = g2, because A1 > A2, we have l1 > l2, R1 > R2 and 1 > 2 for any w.
In the economy, there are a small number of large entrepreneurs and a large number of small
entrepreneurs. We normalize the measure of large entrepreneurs in the economy to one and let the
measure of small entrepreneurs be M with M >> 1. We assume that one entrepreneur only sets
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up one rm, because each entrepreneur has just enough attention or capital to run one business.
Since the modern technology is more ecient, each large entrepreneur sets up a modern rm and
becomes the incumbent of the modern sector. With an entrance cost k, a small entrepreneur can
also enter the modern sector and use the modern technology (see, Lucas, 1978). We suppose that
the entrance cost k is uniformly distributed on [0;K] with the density m = M=K. We call a small
entrepreneur (rm) with k entrance cost a k-type entrepreneur (rm). We can interpret the entry
cost as the cost of accessing or learning to use the modern technology. This cost varies across small
entrepreneurs due to their dierent human capital or other resources that are complementary to the
modern technology.
We denote the numbers of small entrepreneurs who choose to enter the modern and the primitive
sectors as y1 and y2 = M   y1 respectively. If a k-type entrepreneur nds that it is more protable
to enter the modern sector, this entrepreneur and the small entrepreneurs with lower entry costs will
all enter the modern sector. So there exists a cut-o entry cost k such that small entrepreneurs enter
the modern sector if and only if their entry costs are less than k. Therefore we have y1 = mk and
y2 =M   y1 = m(K   k).
In developing countries, government investments are usually critical for economic growth, but
government resources are often quite limited. Allocating more resources to any of these two sectors
will improve the eciency of the rms in that sector. Thus, governments need to decide how to
eciently allocate these scarce resources between the modern and the primitive sectors. In our
model, we suppose that the total amount of resources the government has is G, out of which G1
is allocated to the modern sector and G2 to the primitive sector, where G1 + G2 = G.
7 Then
the amount of government resources a representative modern rm gets is g1 = G1=(1 + y1), and
similarly g2 = G2=y2. Note that in our specication of production functions, the average government
resources in the sector i, gi, aects the eciency of rms in sector i. This assumes that there is
strong congestion eect, or \exclusivity," about government resources: rms' production eciencies
are increasing in the government resources allocated to their sector, but decreasing in the number of
the rms in their sector. Many government expenditures have the features of public goods, but few
have the feature of pure non-exclusivity. As long as there is a suciently strong degree of exclusivity,
our qualitative results still hold.
In the basic model, we consider a benevolent government who maximizes the total outputs of
the economy. In Section 4 we briey discuss what happens when the government is not benevolent.
7Here we make the simplifying assumption that the government's total resource available G is exogenously xed.
It is easy to generalize the model to the case in which G is endogenously determined by the total tax revenue of the
economy. The analysis would be much more cumbersome, without gaining much additional insight, thus we will not
pursue the extension.
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Specically, the government in the basic model maximizes the following function:
U = (1 + y1)R1 + y2R2   y21=(2m): (2)
where y21=(2m) is the total entrance costs incurred by the small entrepreneurs entering the modern
sector with entrance costs between [0; k = y1=m], and R1 and R2 are the outputs of representative
rms in the modern and the primitive sectors respectively.
We consider the following game. At date 1, the incumbent modern rm sets a wage standard w1
for the modern sector. At date 2, small entrepreneurs choose to enter one of the two sectors, and at
the same time, the government makes a resource allocation decision.8
By our assumption of the wage equalization eect, once the incumbent modern rms set a wage
standard w1, all new entrants to the modern sector have to pay the same wage rate. This is of
course a strong assumption. What we really need is that if the incumbent rms in the modern
sector pay a wage rate of w1, rms that pay their workers less than w1 suer productivity losses
and their eective labor costs increase. In Section 4, we discuss what happens if we relax the wage
equalization eect. We assume the wage-equalization eect only applies to the modern sector but
not the primitive sector. One expects that worker turnovers tend to happen among similar rms and
people make fairness comparisons with others in similar situations. Moreover, rms with dierent
production technologies and organizational structures may respond dierently to high outside wage
rates. For example, rms in the primitive sector may not be aected by higher wages in the modern
sector because they can monitor their workers much more eciently due to their small sizes and
simple organizational structures.
The wage equalization eect is self-enforcing: any incumbent modern rm will not nd it prof-
itable to deviate from the optimal wage standard w1. Therefore, it is not necessary for the incumbent
rms to explicitly coordinate their wage levels. But explicit coordinations, such as those through
industry associations, certainly help enforce an equalized market wage standard. Other mechanisms
such as reputations, unions, and minimum wage regulations may also help enforce the market wage
levels (Williamson, 1968).
With the wage rate w0 in the primitive sector and w1 in the modern sector, the outputs of the
representative rms in the two sectors, R1 and R2, in Equation (1), are given by
R1 = A
1
1 
1 (

w1
)

1  (
G1
1 + y1
)

1  ;R2 = A
1
1 
2 (

w0
)

1  (
G2
y2
)

1  : (3)
8The critical assumption of the timing of the model is that large entrepreneurs move before small entrepreneurs and
the government. Changing the order of the moves by small entrepreneurs and the government does not alter the model
results.
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2.2 The First Best Solution
The rst best solution of the model is a triplet (w1; y1; G1) that yields the greatest total output.
Since the total output in the modern sector is decreasing in w1, so in the rst best solution it must
be that w1 = w0. Then (y1; G1) solves the following problem:
max
y1;G1
U = (1 + y1)A
1
1 
1 (

w0
)

1  (
G1
1 + y1
)

1  + y2A
1
1 
2 (

w0
)

1  (
G2
y2
)

1    y
2
1
2m
;
where G2 = G G1 and y2 =M  y1. Assuming interior solution, we obtain the rst-order-condition
with respect to y1:
(1  
1  )A
1
1 
1 (

w0
)

1  (
G1
1 + y1
)

1    y1
m
= (1  
1  )A
1
1 
2 (

w0
)

1  (
G2
y2
)

1  : (4)
The left hand side of the above equation is the marginal product of y1, which equals the marginal
output in the modern sector (net of the marginal congestion eect measured by =(1   )) minus
the marginal entrance cost (y1=m). The right hand side is the marginal cost of y1 measured by the
loss of marginal revenue to the primitive sector.
The rst-order condition with respect to G1 is
A
1
1 
1 (

w0
)

1  [
G1
1 + y1
]

1  1 = A
1
1 
2 (

w0
)

1  [
G2
y2
]

1  1: (5)
This can be simplied as A1g
+ 1
1 = A2g
+ 1
2 , or g1 = g2(A1=A2)
1=(1  ). Thus the government
will optimally allocate more resource per rm in the modern sector than in the primitive sector,
because the marginal productivity of government resource is higher in the modern sector.
Since the objective function U is concave in (y1; G1), the second order conditions are satised.
Therefore, if the solution of the two rst-order conditions exists, that denes a pair of optimal choices:
the optimal size of the modern sector (1+ y1) and the optimal government resource allocation (G1).
We have the following assumption to ensure the existence of the solution.
Assumption (A1) K > 1  1  [A
1
1 
1  A
1
1  
2 A
 
(1  )(1 )
1 ][

w0
]

1  [ G1+M ]

1  :
Proposition 1 below characterizes the rst best solution (all technical proofs are in the Appendix).
Proposition 1 In the rst best solution, the wage rate in the modern sector is w1 = w0. Under
Assumption (A1), the optimal size of the modern sector (1+y1) and the optimal government resource
allocation (G1) are characterized by the unique solution to Equations (4) and (5).
Assumption (A1) ensures that not all small entrepreneurs should enter the modern sector in the
rst best solution, even though the modern technology is more ecient than the primitive one. This
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is because: (i) the complementary production input, government resources, are limited, too many
entrants would reduce the eciency level of all modern rms; and (ii) entry to the modern sector is
costly. The condition of Assumption (A1) means that (i) the entrance cost is substantial; or (ii) the
eciency gap of the two technologies is not too large; or (iii) government resources are scarce and
important. These tend to be true in many developing economies. In this paper we only consider a
static model. Dynamically, as the business conditions of the economy improve over time, one expects
that the optimal size of the modern sector becomes larger over time.
3 Equilibrium Analysis of the Model
Now we solve the equilibrium of the model by backward induction, and denote the equilibrium
outcome as ( w1; y1; G1).
At date 2, after observing w1, the government chooses G1 and G2 = G   G1 to maximize U as
given by Equation (2). The rst-order condition is given by
A
1
1 
1 (

w1
)

1  [
G1
1 + y1
]

1  1 = A
1
1 
2 (

w0
)

1  [
G2
y2
]

1  1: (6)
This equation is analogous to Equation (5) and the only dierence between the two equations is that
the wage rate of the modern sector on the left-hand side is now w1 instead of w0. Clearly, given y1,
G1 decreases in w1 as a higher wage rate in the modern sector reduces the eciency of this sector
and hence reduces the marginal value of G1. However, y1 is not xed and is in fact aected by w1.
The wage rate in the modern sector aects the number of small entrepreneurs entering this sector.
At date 2, after observing w1, small entrepreneurs also make their sector choices. Since the
number of small entrepreneurs is large, we assume that each small entrepreneur ignores the eect of
his own sector choice on the government policy G1. Small entrepreneurs will enter the modern sector
if their entry costs are below a threshold level k1. A small entrepreneur must be indierent between
the two sectors if his entry cost is exactly at k1. Since y1 = mk1, this indierence condition is:
1  2 = (1  )A
1
1 
1 (

w1
)

1  (
G1
1 + y1
)

1    (1  )A
1
1 
2 (

w0
)

1  (
G2
y2
)

1  =
y1
m
: (7)
In this equation, given G1, y1 decreases in w1 because a higher wage rate reduces the protability of
the modern sector and makes it less attractive to the small entrepreneurs. Equation (7) is analogous
to Equation (4). Rewriting Equation (4) yields 1  2 = (1 )
2
1  
y1
m . We can think of this rst-best
condition as the case that small entrepreneurs and the government simultaneously make decisions
but small entrepreneurs' marginal cost of entering the modern sector is (1 )
2
1  
y1
m instead of
y1
m . This
dierence arises from two factors: (i) small entrepreneurs maximize their prots while the social
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planner maximizes social outputs; and (ii) the small entrepreneurs do not take into account the
externalities of their decisions on others.
To focus on the more interesting case, we make the following assumption:
Assumption (A2)  <   2:
Assumption (A2) implies that the marginal cost to enter the modern sector is smaller in the rst
best solution than in the equilibrium of the model. Otherwise we might obtain the uninteresting
outcome that equilibrium entry to the modern sector is more than the ecient level. Assumption (A2)
says that relative to the labor share in the production function, the share of government resources
cannot be too large. Considering the fact that labor and other factors (such as capital and land) not
explicitly included in our analysis are direct production inputs, this assumption is quite plausible.
If there is a solution to Equations (6) and (7), then we obtain an equilibrium of the second stage
subgame. Let (G1(w1); y1(w1)) denote the stage equilibrium.
Lemma 1 Under Assumptions (A1) and (A2), there is an interior equilibrium of the second stage
subgame (G1(w1); y1(w1)). Furthermore, both G1 and y1 decrease in w1.
Because of the similarities between Equations (4) and (7) and between Equations (5) and (6), the
argument of Lemma 1 parallels that of Proposition 1.
Lemma 1 can be illustrated by Figure 1 below.9 The vertical axis is the total government resource
allocated to the modern sector, the horizontal axis is the number of entrants to the modern sector.
The curve Z(y1;w0) represents the government's optimal decision rule regarding resource allocation
(from Equation 5), and the curve W (y1;w0) represents the socially optimal entry condition to the
modern sector (from Equation 4), both at the wage rate w0. The interception of Z(y1;w0) and
W (y1;w0), labeled as \A", is the rst best solution (G

1(w0); y

1(w0)). If the modern sector wage rate
is kept at w0 but small entrepreneurs make entry decisions, the entry condition (Equation 7) can be
represented by V (y1;w0), which lies in the upper left region ofW (y1;w0) in Figure 1. This is because
for the same G1, fewer small entrepreneurs will enter the modern sector than in the rst best as the
prot dierential, instead of the revenue dierential, between the two sectors needs to compensate
for the entry cost. If the incumbents in the modern sector set the wage standard at w1 = w0, then
the equilibrium is the interception of V (y1;w0) and Z(y1;w0), labeled as \B" in Figure 1.
Now consider the case when w1 > w0. Compared with the case when w1 = w0, there will be fewer
entrants to the modern sector for a xed amount of total resources allocated to the modern sector,
so V (y1;w1) lies in the upper left region of V (y1;w0) and tilts further towards left as w1 increases.
9All the curves in Figure 1 are not supposed to be linear. We use straight lines only for simplicity.
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Figure 1: Characterization of Equilibrium in the Second Stage
A
B
C  
 
1 0( ; )V y w 1 0
( ; )W y w
1G
*
1 0( )y w11( )y w 1y
1 1( ; )Z y w
as w1 increases 
as w1 increases 
1 1( )G w
*
1 0( )G w
1 1( ; )V y w
1 0( ; )Z y w
The government will allocate less resources for a xed size of the modern sector since rms in the
modern sector are less ecient, which is illustrated by Z(y1;w1) being below Z(y1;w0) and becoming
atter for larger w1. Clearly, when the wage rate in the modern sector is set at w1, the interception
of V (y1;w1) and Z(y1;w1), labeled as \C" at ( G1(w1); y1(w1)), is the equilibrium of the second stage
subgame, and both G1(w1) and y1(w1) decrease in w1.
In the rst stage of the game, incumbent rms in the modern sector choose a wage standard w1,
taking into account the eects on small entrepreneurs' sector choices and the government's resource
allocation. So the problem for large entrepreneurs is:
max
w1
1 = (1  )A
1
1 
1 (

w1
)

1  [
G1(w1)
1 + y1(w1)
]

1  :
Assumption (A3) (i)A2A1 > (
1  
1 + )
1   ; (ii) G is relatively large (the precise condition is given
in the Appendix).
Proposition 2 Under Assumptions (A1)-(A3), in equilibrium the incumbent large entrepreneurs in
the modern sector will set a wage standard higher than the market wage rate: w1 > w0.
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Proposition 2 is our main result. It shows that under reasonable conditions, the incumbent
large entrepreneurs in the modern sector will indeed use high wage standards to limit entrance to
the modern sector by small entrepreneurs. As is clear from the optimization problem of the large
incumbent rms, the tradeo they face is that a higher wage standard directly reduces prot but
may induce the government to allocate more valuable resources per rm to the modern sector.
Assumption (A3) guarantees that at w1 = w0, the latter eect is not only possible but signicant
enough to dominate the former, hence the optimal wage standard is above w0. The rst part of
Assumption (A3) guarantees that the technological gap between two sectors are not too large. If
the primitive technology is too inecient, the government will not allocate many resources to the
primitive sector. Hence the large incumbent rms in the modern sector will see no need to use
high wage standards to limit entrance to their sector. The second part of Assumption (A3) ensures
that government resources are suciently important so that the large incumbent rms are strongly
motivated to limit entrance to the modern sector. The proof of Proposition 2 establishes that under
these assumptions the incumbents in the modern sector obtain greater prots at point C (wage rate
w1 > w0) than at point B (wage rate w1 = w0) in Figure 1.
Proposition 2 shows that one possible reason for the size wage eect in developing countries is that
incumbent large entrepreneurs willingly use high wages to prevent entrance to the modern sector by
small entrepreneurs. Besides providing a new explanation for the size wage eect, other implications
of the equilibrium characterized in Proposition 2 are presented in the following corollaries.
Corollary 1 The number of small entrepreneurs entering the modern sector is smaller than the
ecient level (y1 < y

1).
Corollary 1 shows that the primitive sector will be suboptimally too large because in equilibrium
fewer small entrepreneurs will enter the modern sector than in the rst best solution.10 This result
corresponds nicely with a common phenomenon of developing countries that despite the availability
of modern technology and business practices, a large proportion of population is still stuck with
primitive technology and are slow to \become modern." Corollary 1 can be easily seen from comparing
the equilibrium point C and the rst best point A in Figure 1. Intuitively, the incumbent large rms
in the modern sector set a high wage standard in order to limit entrance to the modern sector. If they
10it is true both in terms of the number of rms and in terms of employment in the modern sector. With higher
wage, each rm in the modern sector will hire a smaller number of workers. On the other hand, higher government
resources per rm make modern rms more ecient and more willing to hire workers. It can be shown that the former
eect dominates the latter and the number of workers a modern rm hires in equilibrium is less than in the rst best
solution. Combined with the fact that there are fewer number of modern rms in equilibrium, the total employment
in the modern sector is lower than the ecient level.
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cannot successfully limit entrance, they will simply pay the market wage rate. When they choose to
set the wage standard above the market wage rate, the size of the primitive sector has to be larger
as some small entrepreneurs are deterred by the high wages in the modern sector.
Corollary 2 The average resources allocated to each rm in the modern sector are greater than the
ecient level (g1 > g

1).
From Figure 1, the slope of V (y1;w1) is steeper than that of W (y1;w0), so G1=y1 is greater than
G1=y1. By the denition of g1 = G1=(1+ y1), the above observation does not exactly imply g1 > g1.
The complete proof is in the Appendix.
Corollary 2 shows that the purely benevolent government is induced to allocate resources in favor
of incumbent rms in the modern sector. By setting a high wage standard, incumbent large rms can
prevent some small entrepreneurs who are potential entrants from entering the modern sector. Thus,
the modern sector will be smaller and the primitive sector will be larger than the rst best (and than
without the high wage standard, i.e., point B in Figure 1). With this change of relative sector sizes,
the benevolent government will swift resources from the modern sector to the primitive sector. But
such a swift is disproportional, making the average resource per rm in the modern sector greater
than the rst best (and than point B without wage manipulation). This benets incumbent large
rms, and is the whole purpose of manipulating the wage standard in the modern sector.
4 Extensions and Discussions
4.1 Relative Wage Equalization
In our basic model, we assume that all entrant rms in the modern sector must follow the incumbent
rms to set the same wage rate by the wage equalization eect. This assumption can be easily
relaxed. As long as high wage rates of the incumbent rms put enough pressure on other rms in
the modern sector to raise their wage rates or cause signicant increases in the eective labor costs
of other rms in the modern sector (e.g., through job turnovers, searching, and shirking), our main
results still hold.
Specically, let w1 still be the wage rate of the incumbent rms in the modern sector and consider
the following general wage equalization eect:
w
0
1 = w0 + (w1   w0);
where w
0
1 is the wage rate of entrance rms in the modern sector, and  2 [0; 1] represents how
strong the wage equalization eect is in the modern sector. When  = 1, w
0
1 = w1, which is the wage
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equalization eect assumed in our basic model. When  < 1, w
0
1 < w1. However, by continuity, as
long as  is suciently close to 1, we should still have w1 > w0 in equilibrium, that is, the large
incumbent rms in the modern sector will still set a wage standard greater than the market wage
rate.
4.2 Non-benevolent Government
In our model, the government has been assumed to maximize the total outputs of the economy. We
have shown that even under this assumption, government policies will tend to be biased in favor
of incumbent big businesses. More realistically, when the government is not benevolent, one would
expect the allocation outcome will be even more biased.
One way the government may not be benevolent is that it is captured by large businesses and
thus favors the modern sector intrinsically in its resource allocation. To model such a bias, the
government's objective function can be specied as
U = (1 + )(1 + y1)R1 + y2R2   y21=(2m);
where  > 0 represents the degree of the government's bias. Compared with the benevolent govern-
ment, now the biased government will allocate more resources to the modern sector for a given y1.
As a result, more small entrepreneurs will attempt to enter the modern sector, holding the wage rate
in the sector w1 xed. The incumbent large entrepreneurs will then raise further the wage rate in the
modern sector to limit entry. Therefore, both the wage distortion and the distortion in governmental
resource allocation will be exacerbated by the government's bias, but obviously our main points of
the basic model are intact.
Another way the government may deviate from maximizing the total outputs of the economy is
that it maximizes its own tax revenue. If the eective tax rate for all the rms in the economy is
the same, there is no additional distortion, because this amounts to maximizing the total outputs.11
However, a more realistic scenario may be that the eective tax rate for large rms is higher than
that for small rms due to the government's limited tax collecting ability in the primitive sector. To
capture this scenario, we specify the government's utility function as
U = 1(1 + y1)1 + 2y22;
where the eective tax rates for the modern sector and the primitive sectors are 1 and 2 respectively,
with 1 > 2. Note that i = (1   )Ri, thus the government's objective function is eectively the
11Note that in our model, each rm's prot i is (1 ) of its revenue Ri, thus it does not matter whether it is sales
tax or corporate income tax.
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same as in the preceding case when it is captured by large businesses. Then for a given y1, the
government tends to allocate more resources to the modern sector than the benevolent government.
However, unlike the preceding case, it is less clear whether small entrepreneurs will nd the modern
sector more attractive because of the tax rate dierential between the two sectors. So the incumbent
large rms in the modern sector may be more or less aggressive in setting a wage standard than in
the basic model. However, unless the tax rate dierential between the two sectors is too extreme,
the incumbent large rms will still set a wage standard higher than the market wage rate.
In summary, when the government is not a social welfare maximizer, our main points will still hold
qualitatively. Note that while government biases may explain distortions of governmental resource
allocation, they cannot explain wage distortion between the modern and primitive sectors.
4.3 Regulatory Entry Barriers to the Modern Sector
Many developing economies have minimum wage regulations, which by and large are enforceable only
in the modern sector. Suppose the government imposes a minimal wage wmin > w0 in the modern
sector. If wmin  w1, nothing changes in the model. If wmin > w1, then the incumbent large rms
must set the wage standard at wmin. Based on the assumption that minimum wage regulation can
only be enforced on rms beyond a certain size, Rauch (1991) shows that large rms pay a higher
wage rate than small rms for homogeneous workers. However, such a theory does not explain why
large rms pay wage rates higher than the legal minimum wage, and is not supported by empirical
ndings (e.g., Schaner, 1998).
Governments in developing countries often impose entrance costs to the modern sector, e.g., high
registration fees and cumbersome regulatory requirements. Analytically this is equivalent to shifting
the entrance cost distribution from [0;K] to [;K + ] in our basic model, where  is the additional
entrance cost imposed by the government. Our analysis of the basic model is largely unchanged
except that the right hand side of Equation (7) needs to add . This additional entrance cost makes
small entrepreneurs less interested in entering the modern sector. This will likely make the incumbent
large rms in the modern sector less aggressive in setting the wage standard (i.e., w1 will be lower).
Thus, regulatory barriers to the modern sector cannot explain the wage premium of the modern
sector, instead, they are more likely to reduce it (see also Velenchik, 1997).
5 Empirical Evidence
We have shown that higher wages can be used by large rms as a means of deterring potential
entry of smaller rms. Without matched employer-employee data, we are not able to fully test this
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theory. However, there are two testable implications of our theory with aggregate data. One is that
industry concentration should be positively correlated with the size-wage eect. The other is that
the size-wage eect is more prominent in developing countries, because governments in developing
countries are more likely to be captured by incumbent big business. In this section, we empirically
test these two theoretical predictions in order to provide some suggestive evidence for our theory.
Our data set is based on the annual surveys of manufacturing and mining rms conducted by the
National Bureau of Statistics of China from 1998 to 2007. These annual surveys cover enterprises
with above ve millions RMB annual sales. Number of the enterprises covered in the surveys varies
from 154 thousands to 335 thousands over the sample period. A wide variety of information of these
enterprises is recorded: identication, ownership, operational performances, accounting and nance,
etc. The data set is usually considered of good quality and has been widely used in the studies of
Chinese rms.12 Table 1 reports the means and standard deviations of selected variables used in our
analysis by survey years. The data of per capita GDP for each province from 1998-2007 comes from
"China Compendium of Statistics 1949-2008" by National Bureau of Statistics of China 13.
5.1 Industrial Concentration and Firm-Size Eect
First, we test whether industry concentration enhances the size-wage eect. Our empirical analy-
sis focuses on the combined eects of rm size and industrial concentration on average wage per
employee. We estimate the following regression:
logwageijpt = i + 1 log assetijpt + 2HHIjt
+3 log assetijpt HHIjt + 4profitijpt +
t +j +  p + "ijpt;
where the dependent variable is the natural log of average wage per employee paid by enterprise i in
industry j, province p and year t ; log assetijpt is the natural log of each rm's xed asset, which is
our measure of rm size; HHIjt is the Herndahl- Hirschman Index, a common measure of industry
concentration. Furthermore, we include the interaction term log assetijpt HHIjt in the regression
to study the relationship between industry concentration and the size-wage eect. The interaction
term is the focus of our regressional analysis. As more protable rms are likely to pay higher wages,
we include profitijpt, the average prot per employee, in the regression to control for this eect. The
three variables, 
t, j and  p are the year eect, industry eect and province eect respectively.
"ijpt is the error term.
12For example, see Bai, Lu and Tao (2009), and Brandt, Van Biesebroeck and Zhang (2009).
13National Bureau of Statistics of China, Department of Comprehensive Statistics, China Compendium of Statistics
1949-2008, China Statistics Press, Beijing 2010.
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In our empirical analysis we rst regress on the full pooled data, and secondly we only focus on
the manufacture sector. For each sample, we estimate two dierent specications. In the baseline
specication, we drop the interaction term of HHI and log asset, and study the size-wage eect
and concentration-wage eect by controlling year, industry and province xed eects. In the second
specication, we include the interaction term into the regression, trying to capture the eect of
industry concentration on the size-wage eect.
Table 2 reports the two specications for the two samples. Our estimations all conrm a very
robust size-wage eect: one percentage increase in rm size (measured in total assets) is associated
with 0.11%-0.12% of increase in average wage (excluding the interaction term). Our estimations also
show that industrial concentration is positively correlated with wage level (Columns 1 and 3). This
is expected as concentrated industries tend to have higher average prot margins and thus may be
able to pay higher wages. Notice that although the coecients of HHI in the second and the fourth
specications are negative, the combined eects of industrial concentration on wage, including both
HHI and the interaction term, is positive because the mean of log asset is 9.73. Also as expected,
rm protability is positively correlated with wage level, with one standard deviation increase in
rm average prot is associated with about 0.88%-1.76 % increase in average wage.
Thus, one testable implication of our theory is conrmed by the positive coecients of the inter-
action terms in column (2) and column (4), which means a positive relationship between industry
concentration and size-wage eect. That is, industrial concentration enhances this size-wage eect.
This is consistent with our theory: the higher wage level large rms raise to deter potential entry
of smaller rms, the more concentrated this industry is. Note that since we control for industrial
concentration and rm protability as well as industry, year, and location eects, this nding can-
not be explained by some simple mechanic reasons such as industrial concentration leads to more
protability and thus to higher wages.
Based on annual survey data of Chinese industrial rms, our empirical ndings suggest that
raising the wage level can be an eective mechanism for large rms to deter potential entry of
smaller rms. This implies that in empirical investigation of the size-wage eect, one should control
for industrial concentration in cross-sectional analysis without industry xed eect or in panel data
analysis no matter whether industry xed eect is used, otherwise the estimation may suer from
the problem of missing variables.
5.2 Firm-Size Eects in Dierent Chinese Provinces
Now we further investigate whether the size-wage eect is more prominent in developing countries.
We do not conduct cross-country analysis to test this implication because unobserved cross-country
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heterogeneity is likely to bias our estimations. Instead, we study the size-wage eects in dierent
provinces of China using the same data. Regional inequality is signicant in China. In 2010, per
capita GDP in Shanghai is 5.6 times of that in Guizhou, one of the least developed provinces.14
We take advantage of large within-country variations in the degree of economic development to test
our implication. If our theory holds, we should expect a stronger size-wage eect in less developed
provinces.
In our tests, we divide Chinese provinces into three categories: high-income, middle income, and
low income provinces, based on their per capita GDP levels. We estimate the following regression:
logwageijpt = i + 1 log assetijpt + 2logpcGDPpt
+3 log assetijpt middlept + 4 log assetijpt  lowpt
+5profitijpt +
t +j +  p + "ijpt
where the dependent variable logwageijpt, the control variables log assetijpt, profitijpt, 
t, j ,  p
and the error term "ijpt are the same as those in the previous subsection. We add provincial per
capita GDP, log pcGDPpt, to control the provincial wage dierentials. Furthermore, we interact rm
size, log assetijpt, with three provincial groups respectively in order to test the scales of size-wage
eects in dierent provincial groups. Here middlept indicates middle-income provinces in the year
t, and lowpt indicates low-income provinces in the year t. The high-income provinces are our base
group.15 Since our theory predicts a stronger size-wage eect in less-developed regions, we expect
positive coecients 3 and 4, and 4 is greater than 3.
Similar to the previous subsection, we rst regress on the full pooled data, and then we focus on
the manufacture sector. For each sample, we estimate two dierent specications, with and without
interaction terms. Table 3 reports the regression results.
As shown in Table 3, for the control variables, we get similar results to those in the previous
subsection. Once we include the interaction terms in Columns 2 and 4, we do nd that the coecients
of both interaction terms are positive, and 4 is indeed larger than 3 as expected. Thus, our
estimations support our model that large rms in less developed regions are more likely to pay higher
wages to deter potential entrants. This is consistent with our argument: without well-functioning
legal and political institutions, governments in less developed regions are more likely to be captured
by interests group and enact preferable policies for them.
14Data source: National Bureau of Statistics of China, China Statistical Yearbook 2011, China Statistics Press.
15For the details of the division of the three provincial groups, see the note of Table 3.
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6 Conclusion
Using a simple model, we demonstrate that incumbent rms in the modern sector can strategically
create entrance barriers through high wage rates and induce the benevolent government to follow
policies in favor of their interests. This provides a new explanation for why there is a substantial
wage premium of large rms in developing countries with abundant labor supply. One empirical
implication is that the size-wage eect, the relative size of the primitive sector, and the degree
of bias on government spending (which can be proxied by, for example, the ratio of higher versus
elementary education expenditures), are positively correlated. If we consider the large incumbent
rms' direct competition motive to limit entrance to their own industries, then we expect the size-
wage eect is positively correlated with industrial concentration. This last implication is supported
by our empirical analysis based on annual survey data of Chinese industrial rms.
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Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1: From Equation (5), we have g2= g1(A1=A2)
1=(+ 1)
. Rewriting it gives
G1
G G1=
1 + y1
M   y1 (
A1
A2
)
1
1   : (8)
This denes a strictly increasing function of G1= Z(y1) with Z(0) > 0 and as y1!M , Z ! G.
Plugging g2= g1(A1=A2)
1=(+ 1)
into Equation (4) and rearranging terms yields
[A
1
1 
1  A
1
1  
2 A
 
(1  )(1 )
1 ][

w0
]

1  (G1)

1 =
1  
1    
y1
m
(1 + y1)

1  : (9)
This also denes a strictly increasing function G1 =W (y1) with W (0) = 0.
Thus, an interior rst best solution exists if Equations (8) and (9) have a solution, or, the two functions,
Z(y1) and W (y1), intersect at a point y1 < M . Since Z(0) > W (0) and as y1 ! M , Z ! G, the solution
exists if W (M) > G, which is satised by Assumption (A1).
Given that Z(0) > W (0) and Z(M) < W (M), the uniqueness is guaranteed if the slope of Z is always
less than that of W . From Equation (8), the slope of Z is given by
Z 0(y1) =
(G G1)2
(M   y1)2 (
A1
A2
)
1
1   1 +M
G
= g1g2
1 +M
G
: (10)
Since g2 = g1(A1=A2)
1=(+ 1) < g1, we must have g2 < G=(1 +M), the average government resource (per
rm) in the whole economy. Therefore, the slope of Z, given by Equation (10), is less than g1.
Let us dene:  = (A
1
1 
1  A
1
1  
2 A
 
(1 )(1  )
1 )(

w0
)

1  . From Equation (9), the slope of W is
W 0(y1) =
1  
1    
y1(1 + y1)

1  =m
G

1 
1
G1
1 + y1
+
(1 + y1)

1  =m
G

1  1
1
(1  )2
(1    )
>
1  
1    
y1(1 + y1)

1  =m
G

1 
1
G1
1 + y1
= g1:
Hence, Z 0(y1) < W 0(y1). So the uniqueness is established. Q.E.D.
Proof of Lemma 1: Because of the similarities between Equations (4) and (7) and between Equations
(5) and (6), the proof of the lemma follows closely that of Proposition 1.
First, we prove that w1  w0(A1=A2)1=. Suppose w1 > w0(A1=A2)1=, we have g1 < g2, and g1 < G1+M .
Therefore, the prot of a modern rm is given by 1 = A
1
1 
1 (

w1
)

1  (g1)

1   A
1
1 
2 (

w0
)

1  ( G1+M )

1  .
However, if the modern rm set the wage to be w0, its prot becomes 1 = A
1
1 
1 (

w0
)

1  (g1)

1  
A
1
1 
2 (

w0
)

1  ( G1+M )

1  . Because the prot is always higher in the latter case, the modern rm will never set
the wage rate higher than w0(A1=A2)
1=.
Rewriting Equation (6) gives
G1
G G1=
1 + y1
M   y1 (
A1
A2
)
1
1   (
w0
w1
)

1   : (11)
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Similar to Equation (8), this denes a strictly increasing function of G1 = Z(y1;w1). For all w1  w0, it can
veried that Z(0;w1) > 0 and as y1 ! M , Z(y1;w1) ! G. Furthermore, Z(y1;w1) is strictly decreasing in
w1.
Dene e = (A1A2 )
1
1   (w1w0 )
 
1   . Since w1  w0(A1=A2)1=, e  1. From Equation (6), we know
g1=g2 = e, thus g1  g2.
Similar as before, we can rewrite Equation (7) to obtain
[A
1
1 
1  A
1
1  
2 A
 
(1  )(1 )
1 (
w1
w0
)

1   ][

w1
]

1  (G1)

1  =
1
1  
y1
m
(1 + y1)

1  : (12)
Note that the left hand side is positive when e > 1. If e  1, then no small entrepreneur will enter the modern
sector (y1 = 0). Equation (12) denes a strictly increasing function G1 = V (y1;w1) with V (0;w1) = 0. It
can be easily seen that for all w1  w0, V (y1;w1) is strictly increasing in w1. Furthermore, by Assumption
(A2), the right hand side of Equation (12) is greater than that of Equation (9). Thus, V (y1;w0)  W (y1).
Therefore, V (y1;w1) > W (y1) for w1 > w0.
Since W (M) > G under Assumption (A1), we have V (M ;w1) > G. Therefore, for any w1  w0, there is
an interior solution to Equations (7)and (6), because Z(y1;w1) and V (y1;w1) intersect at least once. It is also
easy to show that the slope of Z(y1;w1), @Z=@y1 is strictly decreasing in w1, and that the slope of V (y1;w1),
@V=@y1 is strictly increasing in w1 and is steeper than the slope of W (y1). Then from the proof of Proposition
1, it follows that the slope of V (y1;w1) is steeper than the slope of Z(y1;w1) for all w1. Thus, the uniqueness
is proven. The comparative static result with respect to w1 follows from the fact that Z(y1;w1) is strictly
decreasing in w1 and V (y1;w1) is strictly increasing in w1. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 2: A conventional way of proving the proposition is to use the Implicit Function
Theorem to derive dg1(w1)=dw1 from Equations (6) and (7). However, because it is impossible to solve
explicitly forG1(w1) and y1(w1), we still cannot directly solve the large entrepreneurs' optimization problem.
Our approach is to use Equations (6) and (7) to express 1 directly as a function of w1. First, by
denition,
1 = (1  )A
1
1 
1 (

w1
)

1  (g1)

1  ; 2 = (1  )A
1
1 
2 (

w0
)

1  (g2)

1  ;
we can get
g1 = [
1
(1  )A
1
1 
1 (

w1
)

1 
]
1 
 ; g2 = [
2
(1  )A
1
1 
2 (

w0
)

1 
]
1 
 :
Note that Equation (6) can be rewritten as 1=g1 = 2=g2. Substituting the expressions of g1 and g2 in
terms of prots into this equation, we have

1  1 
1 [(1  )A
1
1 
1 (

w1
)

1  ]
1 
 = 
1  1 
2 [(1  )A
1
1 
2 (

w1
)

1  ]
1 
 :
Thus, 2 can be expressed as a function of 1:
2 = (
A1
A2
)
1
+ 1 (
w0
w1
)

+ 11: (13)
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Then both g1 and g2 can be expressed in terms of 1:
g1 = 
1 

1 (1  a) 
1 
 A
  1
1 (

w1
) 

 ; (14)
g2 = 
1 

1 (
A1
A2
)
1 
(+ 1) (
w0
w1
)
(1 )
(+ 1) (1  a)  1  A 
1

2 (

w0
) 

 : (15)
From the denitions g1 = G1=(1 + y1) and g2 = (G G1)=(M   y1), we have y1 = (G  g2M   g1)=(g1   g2).
Then Equation (7) can be rewritten as:
1  2 = 1
m
G  g2M   g1
g1   g2 :
Substituting Equation (13) into the above equation yields
(1  2)m(g1   g2) + g2M + g1 = 1m[1  (A1
A2
)
1
+ 1 (
w0
w1
)

+ 1 ](g1   g2) + g2M + g1 = G:
Using Equations (14) and (15) and by manipulation, we get
1w


1 (
+1 

1 m+
1 

1 ) + 2w

+ 1
0 w
(1 )
(1  )
1 [
1 

1 M   2
+1 

1 m] + 3
+1 

1 mw
2
+ 1
0 w
(+1 )
(1  )
1 = G;
(16)
where
1 = (1  a) 
1 
  

A
  1
1 ;
2 = (1  a) 
1 
  

A
  1
1 (
A2
A1
)
1
1   = 1(
A2
A1
)
1
1   ;
3 = (1  a) 
1 
  

A
  1
1 (
A2
A1
)
2
1   = 1(
A2
A1
)
2
1   :
Equation (16) expresses 1 implicitly as a function of w1. Total dierentiating both sides of Equation (16),
we have
f

1(
+1 

1 m+
1 

1 )w
 

1
+
(1  )
(1    )2w

+ 1
0 w
(1 )
(1  ) 1
1 (
1 

1 M   2
+1 

1 m)
+
( + 1  )
(1    )3w
2
+ 1
0 w
(+1 )
(1  ) 1
1 
+1 

1 mgdw1
+f1w


1 (
m( + 1  )


1 

1 +
1  


1  

1 )
+2w

+ 1
0 w
(1 )
(1  )
1 (
(1  )M


1  

1  
2m( + 1  )


1 

1 )
+
m3( + 1  )

w
2
+ 1
0 w
(+1 )
(1  )
1 
1 

1 gd1 = 0:
At w1 = w0, after some manipulation, the above equation becomes
F1dw1 + w0F2d1 = 0;
where
F1 = [1   2(1  )
1    2 +
 + 1  
1    3]m1 +1 +
1  
1    2M;
F2 = (1   22 +3)( + 1  )m+ [1 +2(1  )M ] 11 :
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Our goal is to show that under the conditions specied in the proposition, d1=dw1 > 0 at w1 = w0, which
implies that the optimal wage choice of the large entrepreneurs must be greater than w0.
It is easy to see that
F2 = (1   22 +3)( + 1  )m+ [1 +2(1  )M ] 11
= 1[1  (A2
A1
)
1
1   ]2( + 1  )m+ [1 +2(1  )M ] 11 > 0:
Thus, d1=dw1 > 0 at w1 = w0 if and only if F1 < 0. We can rewrite F1 as
F1 =
1
1     (1m1 + 2);
where
1 = 1       2(1  )(A2
A1
)
1
1   + ( + 1  )(A2
A1
)
2
1   ;
2 = 1     + (1  )(A2
A1
)
1
1  M:
Clearly 2 > 0. Letting  = (
A2
A1
)
1
1   , we can rewrite 1 as
1 =  (1  )[(1  + )  (1    )]:
Thus, when 1  1 + < , we have 1 < 0.
We now show that under Assumption (A3) part (i), 1m1 + 2 < 0. This implies F1 < 0, and proves
the proposition. At w1 = w0, Equation (16) becomes
w


0 
1 

1 [1 +2M + (1   22 +3)m1] = G:
When 1 > 1 (which can be trivially satised), we have
w


0 
1 +

1 [1 +2M + (1   22 +3)m]
> w


0 
1 

1 [1 +2M + (1   22 +3)1m] = G:
So
1 >
G

1 +
w

1 +
0 [1 +2M + (1   22 +3)m]

1 +
:
Thus, when
G > w


0 1[1 + M + (1  )2m]( 
2
m1
)
1 +
 ;
we have 1m1+2 < 0. The above condition is Assumption (A3) part (ii), which holds when G is suciently
large. Q.E.D.
Proof of Corollary 2: From Figure 1, it is obvious that y1 < y

1 . From the optimization problem
of the large incumbent rms in the modern sector, we must have g1 > g1(w0), where g1(w0) is the average
resource per rm in the modern sector if the wage standard in the modern sector is set at w0. Now we show
g1(w0) > g

1 .
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At w1 = w0, Equations (5) and (6) are identical and both can be rewritten as g2 = g1=e, where e =
(A1=A2)
1=(1  ) > 1. From G1 +G2 = G, we have
g1(w0)(1 + y1(w0)) + g1(w0)(M   y1(w0))1
e
= g1(w0)(1 +M=e) + g1(w0)y1(w0)(1  1=e) = G;
and
g1(1 +M=e) + g

1y

1(1  1=e) = G:
From Figure 1, it is clear that y1(w0) < y

1 . Thus, we must have g1(w0) > g

1 . Therefore, g1 > g

1 . Q.E.D.
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Table 1: Summary Statistics
year Obs. stats Wage per person Firm Employment Prot per person Firm Assets
1998 157073 mean 7.976959 383.5416 4.137863 67086.88
sd 63.33086 1888.681 224.3649 589760.6
1999 154928 mean 8.195647 371.17 4.275317 74921.86
sd 36.24635 1733 76.86758 656420.9
2000 156306 mean 9.088975 351.6987 6.697099 78618.92
sd 60.77304 1536.299 70.8636 692282.1
2001 165717 mean 10.44901 324.2696 8.454953 78873.79
sd 194.9111 1416.631 160.7917 693320.5
2002 177028 mean 10.93412 309.5398 11.32408 80260.46
sd 108.3178 1363.342 231.4096 694805.1
2003 194580 mean 11.05308 294.9044 13.00603 82808.57
sd 12.10308 1272.33 166.4333 760097.2
2004 274377 mean 12.73157 241.1188 15.23409 70297.9
sd 57.8819 1093.99 588.4592 1045584
2005 270227 mean 14.57888 266.7735 20.45954 80051.39
sd 105.302 1202.28 724.9368 1174841
2006 299589 mean 15.18538 245.3845 21.60578 84570.64
sd 13.63194 1193.028 543.328 1250180
2007 335258 mean 17.25666 234.6345 27.27712 88044.08
sd 49.34011 1157.093 495.7089 1318622
Total 2185083 mean 12.56053 288.2953 15.30164 79447.65
sd 81.27813 1350.729 440.2816 1002959
1 Monetary unit: thousand RMB.
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Table 2: Industrial Concentration and Average Wage
All Sectors Manufacture Sector
(1) (2) (3) (4)
log(asset) 0.111*** 0.107*** 0.108*** 0.104***
[0.000319] [0.000378] [0.000435] [0.000474]
HHI 0.313*** -1.394*** 0.419*** -1.491***
[0.0150] [0.0916] [0.0160] [0.103]
HHI*log(asset) 0.173*** 0.195***
[0.00908] [0.0103]
log(average prot) 0.0000401*** 0.0000392*** 0.000277*** 0.000277***
[0.0000123] [0.0000124] [0.0000597] [0.0000596]
intercept 1.298*** 1.339*** 1.543*** 1.579***
[0.00576] [0.00610] [0.0156] [0.0156]
R2 0.350 0.350 0.350 0.350
Obs 2139461 2139461 1976300 1976300
1 Dependent variable is the natural log of average wage.
2 *** p < 0:01, ** p < 0:05, * p < 0:1.
3 All regressions include year FE, industry FE and province FE.
4 All the values reported in this table have been adjusted to real values. We use CPI to deate
wages, PPI to deate prots, and IPI (Investment Price Index to deate xed assets.)
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Table 3: Industrial Concentration and Average Wage
All Sectors Manufacture Sector
(1) (2) (3) (4)
log(asset) 0.111*** 0.110*** 0.109*** 0.108***
[0.000319] [0.000342] [0.000436] [0.000463]
Middle*log(asset) 0.00200*** 0.00174***
[0.000383] [0.000419]
Low*log(asset) 0.00306*** 0.00469***
[0.000667] [0.000718]
log(per capita GDP) 0.385*** 0.404*** 0.370*** 0.386***
[0.0140] [0.0143] [0.0149] [0.0151]
log(average prot) 0.0000402*** 0.0000402*** 0.000277*** 0.000277***
[0.0000123] [0.0000123] [0.0000597] [0.0000598]
intercept -2.494*** -2.672*** -2.092*** -2.240***
[0.138] [0.141] [0.148] [0.150]
R2 0.350 0.350 0.350 0.350
Obs 2139461 2139461 1976300 1976300
1 Dependent variable is the natural log of average wage.
2 *** p < 0:01, ** p < 0:05, * p < 0:1.
3 All regressions include year FE, industry FE and province FE.
4 All the values reported in this table have been adjusted to real values. We use CPI to deate wages,
PPI to deate prots, and IPI (Investment Price Index to deate xed assets.)
5 middle = 1 if province p is a middle-income province in terms of its per capita GDP level (ranked
from 12 to 21 in year t). ow = 1 if province p is a low-income province in terms of its per capita
GDP level(ranked from 22 to 31 in year t). High-income provinces are ten provinces with the
highest per capita GDP levels, and they are set as base group.
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